Last Minute Policies and the Incumbency Advantage by Manzoni, Elena & Penczynski, Stefan P.
Last minute policies and
the incumbency advantage∗
Elena Manzoni†
Stefan P. Penczynski‡
This paper models a purely informational mechanism behind the in-
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use in later statements, the incumbent’s incentives to distort the campaign
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1. Introduction
Our paper links the empirically established phenomenon of incumbency advan-
tage to the timing of the political announcements in an electoral campaign. In
our model, an incumbent, when competing against a challenger candidate for
reelection, can credibly signal the relevance of an issue to the voters. This is due
to government responsibilities that force him to act on problems of particularly
urgent nature that we call emergencies. He can use this ability also to make
salient those issues on which he is particularly competent. The flipside of this
government responsibility is that an important issue might require immediate
political action and force him to position himself. In response to the incumbent’s
action, the challenger can subsequently position himself optimally. This trade-off
between influencing the agenda and revealing information governs the analysis of
campaign statements in this paper.
An example of such informational manipulations can be seen in the US election
campaign 2004 when incumbent George W. Bush raised the terror alert level
one day after the Democratic convention, possibly undoing the traditional post-
convention rise in the polls (CBS, 2004). In the remainder, we will illustrate our
model with a detailed analogy to the case of Germany’s chancellor Schro¨der who
suddenly opposed the Iraq invasion in the federal election campaign 2002.
We model this trade-off in an electoral campaign over two periods with two
political issues. The campaign is run by two politicians, a challenger and an
incumbent. The challenger can only make statements about his proposed policies
in the second period, while the incumbent can choose to take a stand on one issue
in the first period. As a consequence, we can interpret period 1 as the last period
of the previous government, and period 2 as the proper electoral campaign.
We assume that the incumbent is more competent on one of the two issues –
his signature issue – in the sense that he holds more precise information on that
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issue. The issue on which he is more competent is common knowledge; however,
we assume that the extent of his competence – the precision of his information
– is the incumbent’s private information. The incumbent may have an incentive
to focus the voters’ attention on his signature issue by announcing his policy in
period 1. This strategy is effective since it shifts the voters’ perception of which
issue is “relevant” and therefore may shift the perception of the best candidate.
The incumbent’s power to change the voters’ beliefs on the relevance of the issues
results from the existence of “emergencies” in which he is forced to take a stand on
the relevant issue. The incumbent’s actions in period 1 may thus be informative
about the nature of the relevant issue.
The incumbent’s incentive to take an early stand and influence the debate
is however mitigated by the above mentioned trade-off: early announcements
disclose the incumbent’s private information not only to the voters, but also to the
challenger, who can best respond to it. Therefore, in equilibrium it is not always
optimal for an excellent incumbent to reveal his precise information and influence
the electorate’s political agenda. In other words, the returns to incumbency are
decreasing in the quality of the incumbent. This is in line with the findings of
the empirical literature; Aidt, Veiga and Veiga (2011) show how the incumbent’s
opportunistic behavior that distorts the electoral campaign diminishes when the
incumbent’s win-margin increases. Gordon and Landa (2009) provide a number
of models in which high quality incumbents benefit less from the incumbency
advantage, with the best incumbents potentially suffering from incumbency.
Our model shows that the decreasing incentive of a high quality incumbent to
distort the electoral campaign does not translate in a monotonically more efficient
outcome. In particular we find that welfare is influenced both by the incumbent’s
competence and by the beliefs on such competence. While an incumbent with a
higher competence always improves the chances of appropriate policy measures,
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the challenger mimics the incumbent only when he believes that his information is
good enough. A mimicking challenger, however, is not providing the voters with
alternatives, therefore an incumbent with a better reputation does not necessar-
ily result in better options. The inefficiencies that arise from the incumbent’s
and the challenger’s behavior therefore respond differently to the expected and
the true competence. First of all they are decreasing in the incumbent’s true
expertise. Their response to the incumbent’s reputation for competence instead
varies: if the incumbent’s true expertise is low an increase in his reputation will
increase the inefficiencies; if his true expertise is high an increase in his reputa-
tion will decrease them. There is therefore an interesting interaction between the
incumbent’s characteristics and his reputation in the determination of welfare.
In our model, the incumbent’s power of shifting voters’ beliefs originates from
the existence of emergencies on the relevant issue. We can interpret these emer-
gencies in a twofold way. First of all, they may be serious emergencies, which
induce the incumbent government to declare a properly defined state of emer-
gency. The declaration of a state of emergency can be made strategically, as
discussed by Bjørnskov and Voigt (2016), who argue that emergency laws can be
misused to remain in office. Alternatively, we can have a milder type of emer-
gency, which induces the incumbent government to promptly deal with specific
issues by either implementing a policy or taking a public position; this is the
interpretation of our leading example on the 2002 federal election campaign in
Germany. Our model can explain the strategic uses of both types of emergencies
in order to improve the position of the incumbent government.
Our model is related to two different branches of the literature. The main one
is the wide literature on the incumbency advantage. The common explanations
for such an advantage can be grouped in three categories: (i) Environmental
characteristics of the campaign make the campaigning process easier for the in-
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cumbent.1 (ii) Incumbent’s characteristics that differ from the challenger’s ones
through the selection process of the previous election.2 (iii) The incumbent’s
position provides opportunities he uses in his favor.3
The rationale that we provide for the existence of an incumbency advantage
falls in the latter category. The incumbent is able to actively distort the electoral
campaign in order to increase his chances of being elected. The models that
are closest in spirit to ours are by Hodler, Loertscher and Rohner (2010), Dellis
(2009) and Glazer and Lohmann (1999). The first paper considers the pre-election
implementation of inefficient policies that later increase the pressure to act on the
incumbent’s signature issues. In this paper, the authors find that intermediate
types of the incumbent have incentives to distort the campaign. Our model differs
from theirs in the channel through which distortions to the electoral campaign
are induced. In particular, Hodler, Loertscher and Rohner (2010) show that the
incumbent may implement inefficient policies in order to generate his incumbency
advantage; we show that this distortion is possible even with an incumbent who
only implements what he believes to be the most appropriate policy on every
issue, so that it is really the information that distorts beliefs and voter’s behavior.
Moreover, we find distortions induced directly by both the incumbent’s action
and the challenger’s best response. As a consequence we are able to separate
the effects of the incumbent’s competence from the effects of the beliefs of such
competence.
Dellis (2009) and Glazer and Lohmann (1999) analyze how the treatment of
some issues can influence which other issues will be salient in the next election.
1See, for example, Prior (2006) who assumes a greater media coverage for the incumbent and
Gordon, Huber and Landa (2007) who investigate the effects of entry costs for the challenger.
2See, for example, Ashworth and de Mesquita (2008) who model how a quality-based incum-
bency advantage endogenously arises through electoral selection and strategic challenger
entry.
3Examples are an increased constituency service (Fiorina, 1977) or redistricting (Cox and
Katz, 2002).
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Dellis (2009) analyzes this phenomenon when policy makers are constrained to
implement only one policy per period, while Glazer and Lohmann (1999) con-
sider an electoral competition in which the incumbent government can have pol-
icy commitment before the election. Both papers are framed in a setup that is
structurally different from ours as they deal with ideological candidates that can
make issues salient by avoiding to implement a policy on them; we take an oppo-
site view on this, as the incumbent in our model can increase the saliency of one
issue only by taking an early stand on it, and by doing so he is forced to disclose
his information to the challenger who can best respond to it. A complementary
analysis of the use of information in the incumbent-challenger race is provided
by Ashworth and Shotts (2011), who analyze the effects of the strategic choice
of a challenger who can provide soft or hard information on the incumbent’s
policy choice to the voter. In their model, an incumbent advantage arises when
the challenger is silent, as part of the optimal incentive scheme that induces the
challenger to gather costly information.
A second related branch of the literature considers agenda setting and the
timing of statements. Petrocik (1996) introduces the view that the competence
of a politician in a particular field (“issue ownership”) is relevant for his success.
Abbe, Goodliffe, Herrnson and Patterson (2003) model how politicians’ success
depends on whether their core competencies are “high on the agenda”. Our
setup is inspired by these concepts; we model the agenda setting process by
issues’ true relevance for the voters and the competency of the candidates by the
precision of their information. In this literature, the most relevant paper for our
work is Egorov (2015) which takes a complementary approach: in a world where
voters care about multiple issues he analyzes the behavior of candidates who are
constrained to campaign only on one of those issues.
Section 2 introduces the general features of the model. The analysis of the
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equilibria is contained in Section 3. Section 4 presents an analysis of the distor-
tions that the incumbency advantage may induce. Section 5 concludes after a
brief discussion.
2. The model
We consider a two-period model in which an incumbent I and a challenger C
compete to be elected by a voter after a two-period electoral campaign on issues
a and b. The optimal policy on each issue j = a, b is equal to the state of the
world on that issue, ωj ∈ {−1, 1}, where both states are equally likely. The
state of the world on each issue is unknown during the campaign, and voters and
candidates are heterogeneously informed about ωj.
Notice that we assume that the optimal policy is objectively known to be equal
to the state of the world for every agent (candidates and voter); that is, we do
not assume heterogeneity in preferences.
2.1. Voter
At the beginning of period 1, a representative voter receives two private signals
vj, j = a, b, about issue j’s state of the world, where vj = ωj with probability
δ > 1
2
; signals are independent across issues. The precision of the signal δ is
common knowledge.
The voter’s utility is affected only by the policy implemented on one of the
issues, which we call the “relevant” issue. The identity of the relevant issue is
ex-ante unknown; the voter’s belief is that a is the relevant issue with probability
r; r is the voter’s private information.
Given his signals, the voter follows a simple behavioral rule. At the time of
the election he votes for the candidate who proposes the best policy on the issue
that he views more likely to be relevant.4 If both candidates propose the same
4We are aware that this is a strong assumption in a model with two issues, but we believe
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policy on that issue the voter randomizes with equal probability between the
two candidates. The voter casts his vote comparing candidates only on a small
set of issues and does not use less relevant issues as a tie-breaker.5 Moreover,
we assume that the voter follows his own signal whenever it is in contrast with
other sources of information characterized by the same precision. That is to say,
whenever indifferent the voter follows his own information.
Both candidates’ belief on r is described by a uniform distribution over the
interval [0, k] with 1
2
< k ≤ 1. Therefore the candidates and the voter believe a
is more likely to be relevant with Pr(r ≥ 1
2
) = 2k−1
2k
≤ 1
2
; this implies that the
two issues are asymmetric from an ex-ante perspective.
2.2. Candidates
The two candidates maximize the probability of being elected by taking one of
two positions pIj , p
C
j ∈ {−1, 1} on each issue. They are not characterized by
ideological preferences.
Candidates are asymmetric in three ways. First, at the beginning of period 1
each candidate receives signals on the state of the world with different precisions.
The incumbent’s signal on issue j is sj ∈ {−1, 1} and the challenger’s is tj ∈
{−1, 1}. C’s signal tj is correct with probability δj = δ ∈
(
1
2
, 1
)
for both issues,
reflecting that he is equally competent on both issues.6 The incumbent is instead
more competent on issue a than on issue b. More precisely, I’s signal on b is
that it is a useful representation of electoral processes with many independent issues. Under
such conditions boundedly rational voters may be induced to consider only the set of issues
that they believe will be more relevant for the next period. This is in line with psychological
evidence such as in Herstein (1981).
5We interpret ties as being broken by looking at idiosyncratic, random differences between
candidates that are not explicitly modelled here. This interpretation of the tie-breaking rule
is close in spirit to the introduction of a valence parameter, such as, for example, in Laslier
(2006).
6The challenger’s signals have the same precision as the voter’s signals. This is mostly for
notational ease; the results do not change substantially if we assume that the precision of
the voter’s signals differs from the precision of the challenger’s ones, provided that the voter
is weakly more informed than the challenger. Recall that δ is common knowledge.
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uninformative, γb =
1
2
, and γa >
1
2
. Consequently, the incumbent can have
an objectively worse (γa < δ) or better (γa > δ) signal than the challenger on
issue a.7 We assume γa to be a random variable, distributed according to a
continuous probability distribution function f with support
[
1
2
, 1
]
and expected
value E(γa) < δ
2
1−2δ+2δ2 ; the cumulative distribution function is denoted F . The
precise value of γa is the incumbent’s private information. The upper bound on
its expected value is such that a voter who receives opposing signals from the
incumbent and the challenger will find it optimal to follow his own signal. Notice
that it is commonly known that γb =
1
2
; therefore it is common knowledge that
the incumbent is never more competent on b than on a.8
Second, while both candidates can make statements in the second period, which
we consider as the proper election campaign, only the incumbent can take a stand
on one issue in the first period. This can be viewed as the last government period,
in which he can propose or implement a policy on one of the issues. This is
without loss of generality. The challenger has indeed no extra information on the
issues’ relevance that can induce the voter to update his beliefs. Therefore an
early announcement by the challenger would simply reveal his strategic position
to the incumbent, without changing the probability that the election focuses on a
specific issue. Every politician can take a stand on each issue only once because
he effectively commits to the proposed policies.
Finally, with probability z there is an “emergency” on the relevant issue, which
can be observed only by the incumbent. In this case, it is the incumbent govern-
7The model can easily be extended to the case of a challenger that is not equally competent
on both issues. This delivers no further insights as most of the strategic behavior comes
from the incumbent. The case of an equally competent incumbent, instead, is not relevant
for our analysis, as it displays no incentive at all for the incumbent to influence the voters’
perception of the issues.
8A similar information setting could arise if the candidates get differently precise signals about
the voters preferences with respect to policies which arise probabilistically from the state
of the world. To accomodate this interpretation of the model, the precision of the voter’s
signal should be set to δ = 1.
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ment’s responsibility to act immediately on such issue. This puts a restriction on
the incumbent’s set of feasible strategies such that he has to act on the relevant
issue by announcing pIj in period 1. Emergencies can arise only on relevant issues.
Due to his position, the incumbent gets to know whether there is an emergency
on either issue through his signal ζ ∈ {a, b, ∅}.9
Politicians cannot hide an emergency from the public, while they can make
believe that there is an emergency even when this is not the case.
The challenger’s strategy is a mapping
σC : {−1, 1}2 × {∅,−1, 1}2 → {−1, 1}2, (1)
associating a pair of promises (pCa , p
C
b ) to the vector that includes the signals
(ta, tb) and the incumbent’s observed promise (if any).
The incumbent’s action space is instead {A,B, ∅} × {−1, 1}2, where A and B
indicate the choice of promising pIa or p
I
b , respectively, in the first period, and ∅
the waiting until the second period. With the signals on the states of the world
and the emergency, the incumbent’s strategy is
σI : {a, b, ∅} × {−1, 1}2 → {A,B, ∅} × {−1, 1}2, (2)
where the following restrictions from emergency apply:
σI(a, sa, sb) ∈ {A} × {−1, 1}2, (3)
σI(b, sa, sb) ∈ {B} × {−1, 1}2. (4)
No restriction applies to σI(∅, sa, sb).
2.3. Timing
Figure 1 summarizes the timing of the electoral campaign. At the beginning
of the first period, the voter, the incumbent, and the challenger receive signals
9We interpret this sharp constraint implied by the emergency as follows. If the incumbent
remains inactive, the existence of an emergency will be observed by the voters, and the
incumbent will not be elected in the subsequent election as a punishment for the absence of
timely measures.
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(r, va, vb), (ζ, sa, sb) and (ta, tb), respectively. In the first period, the incumbent
decides whether to promise pIa, p
I
b , or nothing, where his choice is constrained in
the case of an emergency on the relevant issue. All other promises are revealed
in the second period, the electoral campaign period. In period 3, the voter casts
his vote.
Information Actions
Voter
(r, va, vb)
Incumbent
(ζ, sa, sb; γa)
Challenger
(ta, tb) t = 1
Incumbent
pIa p
I
b ∅
t = 2
Incumbent
(pIa, p
I
b)
Challenger
(pCa , p
C
b )
t = 3
Voter
I C
Figure 1: Timing of the electoral campaign.
2.4. Updated relevance
The voter updates the belief r according to the incumbent’s behavior. The up-
dating is induced by the possibility of an emergency on the relevant issue, in
which case observing a promise on issue j in the first period is informative about
its relevance.
Consider issue a. Let y be the probability that a is spoken about in equilibrium
when there is no emergency. With probability z there is an emergency on the
relevant issue and the incumbent is forced to position himself on the relevant
issue. The voter’s posterior belief when he observes a first period announcement
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on a becomes via Bayes’ rule10
ρ =
(z + y(1− z))r
(z + y(1− z))r + (1− r)(1− z)y . (5)
If ρ is greater than 1
2
the voter bases his decision on issue a, which occurs when
r > (1−z)y
2y−(2y−1)z .
2.5. An exemplary case
The German general election on 22 September 2002 presents a fitting illustration
of the modelled mechanism. The incumbent Chancellor Gerhard Schro¨der (I) led
a coalition of Social Democrats and Greens, which, at the end of July 2002, was
“trailing the conservative opposition (C) by a substantial margin” in the opinion
polls. (Fu¨rtig, 2007, pp. 315)
Ten months after the attacks of 11 September 2001, the issue of fighting ter-
rorism (issue a) only occupied the sixth rank of important political problems. 85
percent of the population saw unemployment and the state of the economy as the
main issue (issue b) in the country.
The conservative parties in Germany are traditionally closer to business and
the supply side of the economy than the Social Democrats. They are perceived as
more competent on matters of the economy. Conversely, any pacifistic attitudes
of the German electorate are better reflected in the more left incumbent coalition
which could therefore gain from a rejection of a military intervention against
Saddam Hussein.
Indeed, in response to worsening public opinion polls, Schro¨der’s party “de-
cided on 1 August to begin the final phase of the re-election campaign earlier
10More extensively ρ is the probability that a is relevant given that the incumbent makes an
announcement on a in period 1. Such announcement can be due to (i) an emergency on
the relevant issue a, which happens with probability zr; in this case the probability of
an announcement on a is 1, (ii) a being relevant but no emergency, which happens with
probability r(1− z); in this case the probability of an announcement on a is y, (iii) b being
relevant but no emergency, which happens with probability (1− r)(1− z); also in this case
the probability of an announcement on a is y. The only case in which there can be no early
announcement on a is when b is an emergency (probability (1− r)(1− z)).
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than planned.” (Fu¨rtig, 2007, p. 315). That day he stated: “We have alarming
news from the Middle East. There is talk of a war. [. . .] Germany is willing to
show solidarity, but is not available for adventures.” (Ddp News Agency quoted
in Fu¨rtig, 2007, p. 316). Schro¨der thus used information that his government
position brought in order to strongly impact the perceived relevance of the topic
of war and terrorism.
If the US had suddenly invaded Iraq on 1 August 2002, an emergency would
have pressed the German chancellor to take a stand on this issue. On the other
hand, the alleged upcoming invasion could be used by the incumbent to claim an
emergency and position himself on the matter, independently of whether it ever
happened.
Within one month of the above statement, the perceived importance of the
Iraq conflict jumped from 6th to 2nd rank although it was very uncertain that a
war would ever be fought and German support ever requested from the US. The
elections on 22 September saw the incumbent coalition confirmed. (Fu¨rtig, 2007,
pp. 317)
3. Equilibrium analysis
We now proceed to the analysis of the equilibrium behavior of the agents in
this electoral system. Given the voter’s behavioral voting rule (Section 2.1), and
his belief updating according to Bayes’ rule (Section 2.4), a Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium of the campaigning game is given by a pair of strategies (σI , σC)
such that (i) I maximizes his expected utility for each profile of signals (ζ, sa, sb),
(ii) C maximizes his conditional expected utility upon observing i’s first period
promise (if any) for each profile of signals (ta, tb), and (iii) beliefs are updated by
Bayes’ rule, if possible.
The first aspect to be considered is what happens in the simplest case, in
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which all the political action is concentrated in the second period. In this period
the candidates’ announcement has no effect on the voter’s belief about which
issue is relevant; therefore, announcements released in this stage cannot move the
voter’s attention from one issue to the other one. Hence, in this stage, candi-
dates choose on each issue the promise that is more likely to correspond to the
voter’s belief about the true state of the world. Notice that the voter receives
informative signals on both issues, and that he is as informed as the challenger.
As a consequence, the game does not display uninformative equilibria in which
both candidates announce the same constant policy, given that the voter would
optimally follow his signal after a challenger’s deviation, and hence the challenger
would profitably deviate to a truthful announcement. Moreover, our assumption
that the voter randomizes between candidates whenever they propose the same
policy, allows us to exclude polarized equilibria (in which each candidate propose
a different constant policy), and equilibria in which only one candidate follows his
signal. Hence, the second stage equilibrium behavior is uniquely the truthful rev-
elation of candidates’ signals. In this respect we differ from Laslier and Van der
Straeten (2004) who showed that more equilibria arise when both candidates are
more informed than the voter. More precisely, the challenger makes announce-
ments according to his signals on both issues, and the incumbent does the same
on issue a; any announcement on issue b is an equilibrium announcement for the
incumbent, as his signal on b is uninformative.
The more interesting aspects of the model are related to the incumbent’s choice
of timing of his announcements, and to the challenger’s second period behavior
when the incumbent announces his policy promise in the first period.
To understand the incumbent’s behavior we first notice that, given the infor-
mational structure of this model, an early announcement beyond emergency on
issue j increases the perceived relevance of issue j. Therefore the incumbent
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makes a first period promise on issue b only when he is forced to, i.e. when there
is an emergency on b. As for issue a, it can be shown that also in the first period
it is optimal for the incumbent to promise what he believes to be the true state
of the world, that is, pIa = sa. If he is in an equilibrium in which the challenger
mimics him, the incumbent is indifferent between any promise in the first pe-
riod; if however in equilibrium the challenger follows his own signal (at least with
positive probability), it is strictly better for the incumbent to promise the policy
that corresponds to his signal, otherwise his winning probability is lowered. The
incumbent’s timing, instead, depends both on the precision of his signal sa and on
the challenger’s behavior. By announcing his policy promise pIa in the first period,
the incumbent reveals his information to the challenger. If the challenger never
mimics the incumbent upon observing pIa, every type of incumbent optimally
promises pIa in the first period; in this way the incumbent increases the likelihood
that a is the decisive issue for the election, without changing the challenger’s
behavior, that is, without altering the conditions of the competition. If there is
a positive probability that the challenger will mimic the incumbent’s promises,
instead, only incumbents with a low γa will make an early announcement on a;
a first period promise on a in this case has two effects: it increases the likelihood
that a will be the decisive issue, but it also reduces the incumbent’s probability
of winning the competition on issue a. As the cost of such early intervention on
a is increasing in γa, while the benefit is constant, the incumbent’s strategy is
characterized by a threshold Ξ below which the incumbent promises pIa in the
first period.
The challenger’s behavior, instead, can depend only on the distribution of γa,
not on γa itself. Given the incumbent’s threshold strategy, if the distribution
f gives sufficient weight to low competencies (E(γa) < δ), the challenger never
mimics the incumbent; this implies that all types of incumbents are active in
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the first period. If f gives sufficient weight to high competencies, so that the
incumbent’s expected precision conditional on the fact that he announces pIa in
the first period is greater than the challenger’s precision on a the challenger always
mimics the incumbent. In this case the challenger finds the incumbent’s signal
more reliable in expectation than his own, even conditioning on the fact that
the incumbent’s type is low enough to speak in the first period.11 Intermediate
cases generate challenger’s mixed behavior. Proposition 1 fully characterizes the
equilibrium behavior and the relevant thresholds, depending on the perceived level
of competence of the incumbent. The formal proof is included in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 The unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is characterized as fol-
lows, depending on the properties of F (·).
(Region 1) E(γa) < δ.
- The incumbent promises pIj = sj, j = a, b. If ζ = j he promises p
I
j in
the first period; if ζ = ∅ he promises pIa in the first period.
- The challenger promises pCb = tb and p
C
a = ta.
(Region 2) (1−z)F(Ξ)2k
z(2k−1)+(1−z)F(Ξ)2kE(γa|γa ≤ Ξ) + z(2k−1)z(2k−1)+(1−z)F(Ξ)2kE(γa) > δ.
- The incumbent promises pIj = sj, j = a, b. If ζ = j he promises p
I
j in
the first period; if ζ = ∅ he promises pIa in the first period if and only
if γa < Ξ, where Ξ = min(1,max(0.5, ξ)) and ξ is the solution to the
implicit equation Ξ = δ +
([2F (Ξ)−(2F (Ξ)−1)z]−2F (Ξ)(1−z))( 14−δ+δ2)
(2k−1)(δ− 12)[2F (Ξ)−(2F (Ξ)−1)z]
.
11The incumbent’s expected precision given that the challenger observes an early announcement
on a and given that the incumbent makes early announcements in absence of an emergency
only for γa < Ξ is
(1− z)F (Ξ)2k
z(2k − 1) + (1− z)F (Ξ)2kE(γa|γa ≤ Ξ) +
z(2k − 1)
z(2k − 1) + (1− z)F (Ξ)2kE(γa).
The updating weights the incumbent’s unconditional expected type, and the expected type
when γa < Ξ for the (ex-post) probability that there is an emergency on a and for the
ex-post probability that there is no emergency on a, respectively.
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- The challenger promises pCb = tb and p
C
a = ta if there has been no
annoucement on a in the first period, and pCa = p
I
a otherwise.
(Region 3) (1−z)F(Ξ)2k
z(2k−1)+(1−z)F(Ξ)2kE(γa|γa ≤ Ξ) + z(2k−1)z(2k−1)+(1−z)F(Ξ)2kE(γa) < δ and E(γa) > δ.
- The incumbent promises pIj = sj, j = a, b. If ζ = j he promises p
I
j in
the first period; if ζ = ∅ he promises pIa in the first period if and only if
γa < Ξ(β
∗), where Ξ(β∗) > Ξ is such that (1−z)F (Ξ(β
∗))2k
z(2k−1)+(1−z)F (Ξ(β∗))2kE(γa|γa ≤
Ξ(β∗)) + z(2k−1)
z(2k−1)+(1−z)F (Ξ(β∗))2kE(γa) = δ.
- The challenger promises pCb = tb and p
C
a = ta if there has been no
announcement on a in the first period; if the incumbent has announced
pIa in the first period the challenger promises p
C
a = p
I
a with probability
β∗ and pCa = ta otherwise. The mixing probability β
∗ is such that the
incumbent is indifferent between speaking in the first and in the second
period when γa = Ξ(β
∗).
The model (and Proposition 1) focuses on the case in which the challenger is
equally competent on both issues, while the incumbent is more competent on
issue a and less competent than the challenger on issue b. This is the parametric
region in which the timing of the election statements is most interesting. The
model can however be solved for all other regions. In the following, we briefly
describe what happens under the other possible conditions.
When both politicians are equally competent across issues, the incumbent’s
likelihood of winning is the same regardless of which issue is considered by the
voters. He therefore has no incentive to distort the campaign.
If the incumbent is better informed on both issues, (γa > δa and γb > δb), the
incumbent has even less incentives to distort the campaign. His probability of
winning if voters focus on any issue j is
1+γj−δj
2
> 1
2
. Suppose now that he tries
to distort the campaign in favor of issue a: by doing so he reveals his signal on
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a, the challenger mimics him and his probability of winning on issue a decreases
to 1
2
, so that the incumbent now has a higher probability of winning on issue
b. However, the likelihood that voters focus on issue a increases, so that the
incumbent is unambiguously worse off by trying to influence the debate.
In the remaining cases of both politicians or only the challenger being more
competent on one issue, the intuition is the same as in our main analysis. As long
as the incumbent can increase his likelihood of winning by moving the electorate’s
attention to a particular issue, the behavior will qualitatively be as predicted in
the model. Only the parameter regions in which different equilibria arise will
change.
4. Distortions and inefficiencies
The behavior described in Proposition 1 describes distortions on the candidates’
side which decrease the probability that the policy implemented corresponds to
the true state of the world on the relevant issue. The benchmark is the case
in which both politicians follow their signal and the incumbent speaks in the
first period only when there is an emergency. In this scenario the probability
of electing a politician who implements the optimal policy is increasing in γa.
This is due to the fact that a higher competence increases the probability that a
candidate promising the “correct” policy is offered in the election.
We can distinguish three distortions when the incumbent can choose to speak
in the first period without emergency. First, in the benchmark, the incumbent
speaks in the first period only when there is an emergency, which can only be on
the relevant issue; therefore the emergency of the issue reveals its relevance with
certainty. Once the early statement on issue a might be due to the incumbent’s
interest, the emergency on such an issue can not always be recognized. Hence,
the voter has a distorted expectation of the relevant issue and may not vote
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optimally, as he assigns a probability smaller than 1 to an emergency on a when
it is relevant. Since in every equilibrium there is a positive probability that the
incumbent speaks on a in the first period when there is no emergency on a, such
emergency on a can never be perfectly recognized.
Second, when the incumbent makes a statement on a in the absence of emer-
gency in the first period, he influences the agenda in the sense that he distorts the
perception of which issue is most likely to be relevant. The voter has a distorted
expectation of the relevant issue and may not vote optimally, as he assigns a
probability higher than r to a being the relevant issue. This distortion is present
in region 1 for all incumbent’s types and in regions 2 and 3 for low incumbent’s
types.
The third effect results from the challenger mimicking the incumbent’s state-
ment. The probability that the election offers a candidate who promises the right
policy is diminished as a result of the challenger not using the information of his
signal. This effect has a positive side as well: due to the mimicking, the prob-
ability that the incumbent is elected when the voters vote on issue a decreases,
and therefore the probability of having a candidate who implements the correct
policy on b increases. However, the overall effect of this distortion is negative.
This type of distortion arises when the incumbent speaks in the first period with-
out emergency and the challenger mimics the incumbent, and is therefore present
only when E(γa) > δ (i.e. for distributions of types in regions 2 and 3) and for
low types of the incumbent (i.e, γa smaller than the relevant threshold). More-
over, since the probability of mimicking in region 3 is β < 1, this distortion has
a smaller impact in region 3 than in region 2, so that the equilibrium in region 3
outperforms the one in region 2 for low types.
In our exemplary case, the three distortions would be 1) the inability to per-
fectly identify an emergency on an issue like the Iraq invasion from the words
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of the Schro¨der administration during an election campaign, 2) a biased agenda
with terrorism suddenly and possibly undeservedly rivaling the importance of
the economic problems and 3) the voter’s reduced choice set if the challenger
copies the incumbent’s position, like Stoiber, the conservative candidate, initially
attempted (Fu¨rtig, 2007, p. 318).
For exemplary parameter values, figure 2 illustrates the benchmark and the
three equilibria obtained under different distributions of γa.
12
It illustrates that the probability of electing a politician who proposes the cor-
rect policy is always increasing in γa but it displays non-monotonic patterns in the
expected value of γa (Equilibria 1 - 3). For example, an increase in the expected
competence of the incumbent does not necessarily imply a better outcome for the
voters. More precisely, a low E(γa) (thickly dotted Eq. 1) induces a higher welfare
if the true competence of the incumbent is low (γa < 0.75). Conversely, when the
true competence of the incumbent is high, a high E(γa) (red dotted Eq. 2) leads
to a higher probability of implementing the correct policy. The same is true for
the intermediate value of E(γa) (lightly dotted Eq. 3), the effect, however, only
kicks in when the incumbent refrains from early statements, which happens here
for a higher γa. We can therefore conclude that a higher competence of the in-
cumbent is beneficial for voters’ welfare; however, the expected competence may
be detrimental because it may trigger more distortions that affect negatively the
probability of implementing the correct policy.
A more detailed and analytical analysis of the distortions that arise in the three
types of equilibrium is included in the Appendix.
12γa is distributed according to Beta(αβ , ββ) distributions with parameter αβ = 1.5 and three
different parameters ββ ∈ {0.4, 2, 5}. E(γa) ≡ αβαβ+ββ .
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Figure 2: Probability of implementing the correct policy in different equilibria.
Example with δ = 2/3, k = 0.75, z = 0.1.
5. Conclusion
This paper models a purely informational mechanism behind the incumbency
advantage. We analyze a two-period electoral campaign characterized by two
policy issues in which an incumbent competes against a possibly more competent
challenger. Due to his government responsibilities, the incumbent’s statements
can credibly attach importance to issues and influence the political agenda.
We illustrate the model with a close analogue from German politics, German
Chancellor Gerhard Schro¨der’s strict opposition to the Iraq War which he first
revealed during the reelection campaign 2002. This example clearly shows how the
incumbent administration used its government responsibility as well as its alleged
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office-related informedness to influence the political agenda in its favor. Our
formal treatment investigates the fundamental mechanism behind such agenda
setting and allows us to identify resulting distortions. The analysis of this novel
rationale for the incumbency advantage delivers the following predictions.
First, the incumbent can have an advantage even when he is objectively worse
than the challenger. This is in contrast to the hypothesis of an electoral selec-
tion process that links the incumbency advantage with superior quality of the
incumbent.
Second, the incumbent does not always have incentives to influence the debate
and to use his advantage. If his signal is very informative, he waits to make a
statement and does not give the challenger the possibility to respond optimally to
his information. Indeed, the returns to incumbency are decreasing in the quality
of the incumbent. In other words, if his precise information makes re-election
probable enough in itself, he chooses not to influence the agenda.
Finally, we show that even given that the incumbent’s incentives to distort the
campaign are decreasing in the incumbent’s quality, the probability of implement-
ing the correct policy is monotonically increasing in the degree of the incumbent’s
competence; however, voters’ welfare behaves non-monotonically with respect to
the expected degree of competence. We show that having an incumbent who is
expected to be objectively worse than the challenger may be better for the elec-
torate than one who is expected to be partially more competent only on one of
the issues.
The mechanism covered in our paper can be linked to other interesting top-
ics. Closely related is the improvement of an incumbent government’s position
through the declaration of a state of emergency. Bjørnskov and Voigt (2016)
provide an empirical analysis of the determinants of the use of emergency laws,
and suspect that some emergencies may primarily be declared to strengthen the
22
incumbent’s position. They suggest that the mechanism could be that the state
of emergency allows the incumbent to postpone elections; this mechanism is more
likely to be in place in countries with weak democratic institutions. We argue
that the strategic use of emergencies to improve the incumbent’s position can be
at work also in strong democracies, where the channel may be the distortions of
voters’ perception of what is relevant for the future.
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A. Proof of Proposition 1
We prove Proposition 1 by a sequence of claims. Remember that the voter focuses
only on the issue that he believes to be more likely to be relevant. We begin our
analysis with the behavior of candidates in the second period, when nothing
has been announced in the first period. Hence, we can focus on the optimal
behavior on every single issue separately, as in the last stage there is no interaction
between issues. Our setup therefore reminds of the model of Laslier and Van der
Straeten (2004), with three important differences. First, it is not the case that all
candidates are more competent than the voter. Notably, the challenger’s precision
is equal to the voter’s one. Moreover, we assume that the voter breaks ties
by randomizing between candidates with equal probability, and favours his own
signal whenever it has the same precision as the endogenous information received
by the candidates. These three differences allow us to conclude that the best that
candidates can do is to match the policy offer with the state. More precisely, if
the voter’s precision is weakly larger than the challenger’s one we can prove that
Type 1 equilibria of Laslier and Van der Straeten (2004) are not equilibria in our
model. Secondly, the assumption on the voter’s randomization when candidates
propose the same policy allows us to rule out Type 2 and Type 3 equilibria of
Laslier and Van der Straeten (2004). This implies that the challenger promises
pj = tj for every issue j and that the incumbent promises pa = sa; the incumbent’s
promise on issue b is undetermined, as his signal on b is uninformative.
The incumbent’s possible 4 pure strategies on each issue are pIj = 1, p
I
j = −1,
pIj = sj and p
I
j = −sj. The same holds for the challenger. We prove that truthful
equilibrium exists in the second period (Claim 2). Then, we show that it is unique
by ruling out equilibria in which both candidates play a constant strategy (Claim
3 and 4), those in which they play opposite to the signal (Claim 5) and those in
which only one of the candidates plays according to his signal (Claim 6).
26
Claim 2 If nothing has been announced in the first period on issue j, the fol-
lowing is an equilibrium: pIj = sj, p
C
j = tj, and the voter votes according to his
signal whenever the two proposals differ.
Proof.
When nothing has been announced in the first period, the announcement game
between the challenger and the incumbent is a simultaneous game. Table 1 shows,
for the case in which tj = 1 the challenger’s winning probability if he chooses
pCj = 1 or p
C
j = −1, and j is the decisive issue, given the equilibrium assumption
that the voter acts according to his signal. To understand how each entry in the
table is computed, consider for example the probability of winning when tj = 1
and both the incumbent and the challenger follow their signal,
Pr(sj = 1|ωj = 1) · Pr(ωj = 1|tj = 1) · 1
2
+ Pr(sj = −1|ωj = 1) · Pr(ωj = 1|tj = 1) · δ
+ Pr(sj = 1|ωj = −1) · Pr(ωj = −1|tj = 1) · 1
2
+ Pr(sj = −1|ωj = −1) · Pr(ωj = −1|tj = 1) · (1− δ)
Notice that when both candidates make the same announcement, each one has
a winning probability of 1
2
, while when they make different announcements the
candidate who makes the promise equal to the true state of the world wins with
probability δ, while the candidate that makes the promise that is different from
the true state of the world wins with probability 1 − δ. This is due to the fact
that the precision of the voter’s signals is δ.
Notice moreover that we indicate with E(γj) the expected precision of the
incumbent, where E(γa) > E(γb) = 12 .
It can be easily seen that pCj = 1 is dominant when tj = 1. The same reasoning
can be replicated for tj = −1. Hence, it is a dominant strategy for the challenger
to make promises in accordance with his own signal.
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tj = 1 Incumbent
pIj = 1 p
I
j = −1 pIj = sj pIj = −sj
Challenger
pCj = 1
1
2
δ2 1
2
+
E(γj)
2
− δ
2
1− E(γj)
2
+ E(γj)δ
+(1− δ)2 −E(γj)δ + δ2 +δ2 − 32δ
pCj = −1 2(1− δ)δ 12 32δ +
E(γj)j
2
1
2
+ δ
2
− E(γj)
2
−δ2 − E(γj)δ −δ2 + E(γj)δ
Table 1: Challenger’s expected probability of winning on issue j.
The incumbent’s probability of winning when sj = 1 and the voter acts accord-
ing to his signal, similarly, can be found in Table 2.
sj = 1 Challenger
pCj = 1 p
C
j = −1 pCj = tj pCj = −tj
Incumbent
pIj = 1
1
2
γjδ
1
2
+ γjδ +
δ
2
1− γ
2
+ γδ
+(1− γj)(1− δ) −γj2 − δ2 +δ2 − 32δ
pIj = −1 (1− γj)δ 12 32δ +
γj
2
1
2
− δ
2
+ γ
2
+γj(1− δ) −δ2 − γjδ +δ2 − γjδ
Table 2: Incumbent’s expected probability of winning on issue j.
It can be easily checked that, given δ > 1
2
, pa = sa is a dominant strategy as
long as γa >
1
2
. As for issue b, every strategy delivers the same probability of
winning, given that γb =
1
2
. The incumbent’s expected probability of winning on
issue b when sb = 1 is represented in Table 3.
sb = 1 Challenger
pCj = 1 p
C
j = −1 pCj = tj pCj = −tj
Incumbent
pIj = 1
1
2
1
2
1
4
+ δ − δ2 3
4
− δ + δ2
pIj = −1 12 12 14 + δ − δ2 34 − δ + δ2
Table 3: Incumbent’s expected probability of winning on issue b.
It remains to be checked that the voter has an incentive to follow his own
signal whenever the two policy proposals are in contrast. This is trivially the
case when the disagreement is on issue b (as the voter has the same precision
of the challenger and a greater precision than the incumbent), and when the
disagreement is on issue a and the voter agrees with the incumbent. When the
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disagreement is on a and the voter agrees with the challenger the condition is
guaranteed by the assumption γ < δ
2
1−2δ+2δ2 .
Claim 3 If nothing has been announced in the first period on issue j, there is no
second period equilibrium in which either pIj = p
C
j = 1 or p
I
j = p
C
j = −1 regardless
of the signal.
Proof. In order to show that such a strategy combination is an equilibrium we
need to find out-of-equilibrium beliefs that prevent candidates from deviating.
Suppose for example that we consider issue a and the constant strategy profile
is pIa = p
C
a = 1. Let’s consider a possible deviation of the challenger who may want
to promise pCa = −1 if ta = −1. The equilibrium strategy gives the challenger
an expected probability of winning equal to 1/2. After the deviation, the voter
would observe two different policy proposals. Crucially, the voter’s signal has the
same precision as the challenger, so that, when in contrast, the voter prefers to
follows his own signal as we assumed in the model. This implies that whatever
the out-of-equilibrium belief, the voter follows his own signal if the challenger
deviates.13 The challenger’s expected probability of winning after the deviation
therefore is: δ2 + (1− δ)2 > 1
2
. Hence, the challenger has an incentive to deviate
and the abovementioned strategy profile is not an equilibrium.
The proofs for the other constant strategy and the other issue can be obtained
analogously.
Claim 4 If nothing has been announced in the first period on issue j, there is no
second period equilibrium in which either pIj = 1 = −pCj or pIj = −1 = −pCj .
Proof. In such a strategy profile, each candidate specializes on one of the two
policy proposals. Consider for example issue a and the case in which the chal-
lenger promises pCa = 1 and the incumbent promises p
I
a = −1. However, the
13Notice that this would not always be the case if the incumbent deviates, as his expected
precision may be higher than the voter’s one.
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challenger, for example, has an incentive to deviate to pCa = −1 when ta = −1.
This is due to the fact that the voter randomizes when candidates offer the same
policy. Hence, the probability of being elected after deviating is 1
2
> 1− δ which
is the probability of being elected if he sticks to the proposed strategy profile.
The proofs for the other pair of constant strategies and the other issue can be
obtained analogously.
Claim 5 If nothing has been announced in the first period on issue j, there is no
second period equilibrium in which pIj = −sj and/or pCj = −tj.
Proof. Such an equilibrium can arise in three ways.
i. One candidate can use a constant strategy and the other one a strategy
that is opposite to the signal. If the challenger is the one proposing a
policy which is opposite to the signal the voter will vote according to his
own signal whenever the policy proposals differ. In this case, however, the
challenger has an incentive to reveal his signal truthfully, as this increases his
probability of winning. If instead the incumbent proposes a policy which is
opposite to his signal, the voter’s behavior depends on the relation between
E(γi) and δ. If E(γi) < δ the reasoning is the same as for the challenger. If
instead E(γi) > δ the voter will choose the challenger whenever the policy
proposals differ. Hence, the incumbent has an incentive to propose the
same constant policy as the challenger, which guarantees him a probability
of winning equal to 1
2
.
ii. One candidate can use the truthful strategy, and the other one a strategy
that is opposite to the signal. In this case, the winning probability of the
candidate who adopts the latter strategy is either 1
2
or 0. Such candidate
can improve his probability of winning by truthfully revealing his own sig-
nal. This deviation increases the frequency with which the two candidates
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propose the same policy, hence it increases the likelihood of having a prob-
ability of winning of 1
2
.
iii. Another possibility is that both candidates can propose a policy which is
opposite to their signal. In this case, however, the voter chooses according
to his own signal whenever the proposals differ. So both candidates can
improve their probability of winning by truthfully revealing their signal.
Claim 6 If nothing has been announced in the first period on issue j, there is no
second period equilibrium in which only one candidate proposes a policy equal to
his signal.
Proof. Such an equilibrium can arise in two ways.
i. One candidate proposes a policy that corresponds to his signal, and the
other one a policy which is opposite to his signal. We already proved that
this cannot be an equilibrium (see Claim 5 part ii).
ii. One candidate proposes a constant policy and the other one a policy which
corresponds to the signal. If the candidate that proposes the policy cor-
responding to the signal is the challenger, the voter votes according to his
signal when the policy proposals differ. In this case, the incumbent increases
his probability of winning by proposing the policy equal to his signal. The
same reasoning applies if the incumbent proposes pIb = sb. If instead the
incumbent proposes pIa = sa, the voter always votes for the incumbent when
the policies differ. Hence, the challenger has an incentive to follow his own
signal, and increase the probability of proposing the same policy as the
incumbent in which case he wins with probability 1
2
.
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Now we consider the incumbent’s strategy in the first period. We begin such
analysis by noticing that it is never optimal for the challenger to mimic the
incumbent’s behavior on issue b, and nor for the incumbent to promise something
on issue b, given that his signal on b is uninformative.
Claim 7 The challenger does not mimic any first period announcement on b; the
incumbent announces pIb in period 1 only if ζ = B.
Proof. First of all notice that the incumbent is completely uninformed on issue
b. Therefore, for any value of sb, Pr [ωb = −1|sb] = Pr [ωb = 1|sb] = 12 .
As a first consequence of this, the challenger never finds profitable to mimic his
promise on b in the second period; by mimicking the incumbent’s behavior the
challenger’s probability of winning is 1
2
, while by not mimicking it is δ2+(1−δ)2 >
1
2
.
Therefore the only effect that the incumbent has on the electoral campaign
if he promises pIb in the first period is to increase the perceived relevance of b,
that is to increase the probability that b is the decisive issue. This implies that
his probability of winning by releasing an early statement on b is lower than his
probability of winning when he waits the second period to make announcements.
We now consider the challenger’s mimicking incentives when the incumbent
makes an early announcement on a.
Claim 8 Assume that a set G of incumbent’s types promise pIa = sa in the first
period when ζ = ∅, while types which belong to the complement set do not promise
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anything in the first period. In this case the challenger mimics the incumbent’s
promise iff (1−z)F (G)2k
z(2k−1)+(1−z)F (G)2kE(γa|γa ∈ G) + z(2k−1)z(2k−1)+(1−z)F (G)2kE(γa) > δ.
Proof. Let E(γa|A) be the expected γa conditional to the fact that the incumbent
has announced his policy in the first period. Upon observing pIa announced in the
first period, the challenger believes that there is an emergency on a with probabil-
ity z(2k−1)
z(2k−1)+(1−z)F (G)2k , where F (G) is the measure of the set G. This comes from
the fact that the challenger believes that a is relevant with probability2k−1
2k
, and
that there is an emergency on the relevant issue with probability z. Therefore
E(γa|A) =
(1− z)F (G)2k
z(2k − 1) + (1− z)F (G)2kE(γa|γa ∈ G) +
z(2k − 1)
z(2k − 1) + (1− z)F (G)2kE(γa)
Given that he does not affect which issue the election is decided upon, the
challenger chooses his optimal promise on each issue a in order to maximize
the probability of winning if a is decisive. This probability is equal to 1
2
if the
challenger mimics the incumbent by setting pCa = p
I
a.
If ta = p
I
a the challenger trivially sets p
C
a = ta = p
I
a and wins with probability
1
2
. If ta 6= pIa and the challenger does not mimic the incumbent, his probability of
winning is
Pr(ωa = ta|ta 6= sa)δ + Pr(ωa = −ta|ta 6= sa)(1− δ)
=
δ(1− E(γa|A))
δa(1− E(γa|A)) + E(γa|A)(1− δ)
δ +
(1− δ)E(γa|A)
δa(1− E(γa|A)) + E(γa|A)(1− δ)
(1− δ)
which is greater than 1
2
if E(γj|A) > δ.
We now focus on the incumbent’s behavior on issue a. First we show that it is
optimal for the incumbent to promise pIa = sa also when he makes announcements
in the first period. Then we show that the incumbent’s strategy is monotone in
γa; for a given strategy of the challenger, if a type γ¯a finds optimal to make an
early announcement on a, any lower type (γa < γ¯a) finds it optimal too.
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Claim 9 The incumbent promises pIa = sa also in the first period.
Proof. There are two possible cases, depending on the challenger’s behavior.
i. If the challenger mimics the incumbent, then the probability of winning on
that issue is 1
2
regardless of what the incumbent promised.
ii. If there is a positive probability that the challenger does not mimic the
incumbent, then promising pIj = sj yields a strictly higher payoff, as shown
in the simultaneous case.
Claim 10 The incumbent’s optimal timing strategy is monotone in his type: if
it is optimal for the incumbent to speak on a for some type γ¯a, then it is optimal
for him to speak also for any γa < γ¯a. Moreover, if the challenger mimics the
incumbent with probability 1, such threshold is given by Ξ defined as the minimum
of 1 and the solution to the following implicit equation and the maximum of 0.5
and the solution to the implicit equation
Ξ = δ +
([2F (Ξ)− (2F (Ξ)− 1)z]− 2F (Ξ)(1− z)) (1
4
− δ + δ2)
(2k − 1) (δ − 1
2
)
[2F (Ξ)− (2F (Ξ)− 1)z] .
Proof. Assume that the challenger mimics the incumbent if he speaks in the
first period, and suppose that in equilibrium it is optimal for the incumbent to
speak on a for some type γ¯a. In this case it is optimal for him to speak also for
any γa < γ¯a. To see this, let G be the set of types of the incumbent that speak
on a in equilibrium in the first period, and let F (G) be the probability that the
incumbent’s type belongs to the set G. Assume that γ¯a ∈ G. In this case the
incumbent finds optimal to speak on a in the first period if
k[2F (G)− (2F (G)− 1)z]− (1− z)F (G)
k[2F (G)− (2F (G)− 1)z]
1
2
+
(1− z)F (G)
k[2F (G)− (2F (G)− 1)z]
(
1
4
+ δ − δ2
)
(6)
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is greater than
2k − 1
2k
(
1
2
+ γaδ −
γa
2
+
δ
2
− δ2
)
+
1
2k
(
1
4
+ δ − δ2
)
. (7)
Consider now γa /∈ G such that γa < γ¯a. The first equation does not depend
on the choice of type γa: even if type γa chooses to speak in the first period,
and by doing so belongs to G, this does not affect the probability of G given
the continuity of the probability distribution. This said, the difference between
the two equations is decreasing in γa, therefore if the inequality holds for γ¯a it
holds also for every γa < γ¯a. The incumbent’s choice is thus characterized by a
threshold below which the incumbent will speak on a in the first period.
By equating (6) and (7) we find that the threshold when the challenger mimics
the incumbent with probability 1 is Ξ defined as the minimum of 1 and the
solution to the implicit equation and the maximum of 0.5 and the solution to the
implicit equation
Ξ = δ +
([2F (Ξ)− (2F (Ξ)− 1)z]− 2F (Ξ)(1− z)) (1
4
− δ + δ2)
(2k − 1) (δ − 1
2
)
[2F (Ξ)− (2F (Ξ)− 1)z]
= δ +
z
(
δ − 1
2
)2
(2k − 1) (δ − 1
2
)
[2F (Ξ)− (2F (Ξ)− 1)z]
= δ +
z
(
δ − 1
2
)
(2k − 1)[2F (Ξ)− (2F (Ξ)− 1)z] . (8)
The same reasoning can be applied to the case in which the challenger mimics
the incumbent only with probability β < 1.
Claims 11, 12 and 13 analyze the equilibrium behavior in the three different
parametric regions.
Claim 11 If E(γa) < δ the incumbent announces pIa in the first period and the
challenger does not mimic him.
Proof. Let the unconditional expected value of γa be smaller than δ. This
implies that the expected precision of the incumbent given that he speaks in
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the first period is never be greater than δ, given that the incumbent adopts a
threshold strategy in which he make early announcements for low types (Claim
10). As a consequence, promising sa in the first period is always optimal for
the incumbent, since it increases the probability that the voters look at issue a
without inducing any loss in terms of probability of winning on issue a.
Claim 12 If (1−z)F (Ξ)2k
z(2k−1)+(1−z)F (Ξ)2kE(γa|γa ≤ Ξ) + z(2k−1)z(2k−1)+(1−z)F (Ξ)2kE(γa) > δ the
incumbent announces pIa in the first period if and only if γa < Ξ and the challenger
mimics him on a with probability 1.
Proof. We proved in Claim 10 that the incumbent makes an early announcement
on issue a for types γ < Ξ even if the challenger mimics him with probability 1.
If (1−z)F (Ξ)2k
z(2k−1)+(1−z)F (Ξ)2kE(γa|γa ≤ Ξ) + z(2k−1)z(2k−1)+(1−z)F (Ξ)2kE(γa) > δ, the incumbent’s
expected precision when he makes an early announcement on issue a (which is
weakly larger than the LHS of the inequality) is larger than the challenger’s
precision. Therefore the challenger mimics the incumbent with probability 1.
Hence Ξ is the threshold of the incumbent’s equilibrium strategy.
Claim 13 Let (1−z)F (Ξ)2k
z(2k−1)+(1−z)F (Ξ)2kE(γa|γa ≤ Ξ) + z(2k−1)z(2k−1)+(1−z)F (Ξ)2kE(γa) < δ
and E(γa) > δ. The incumbent announces pIa in the first period if and only
if γa < Ξ(β
∗), where Ξ(β∗) > Ξ is such that (1−z)F (Ξ(β
∗))2k
z(2k−1)+(1−z)F (Ξ(β∗))2kE(γa|γa ≤
Ξ(β∗)) + z(2k−1)
z(2k−1)+(1−z)F (Ξ(β∗))2kE(γa) = δ. The challenger mimics the incumbent
with probability β∗ such that the incumbent is indifferent between speaking in the
first and in the second period when γa = Ξ(β
∗).
Proof. Notice that this is possible only when Ξ < 1. We analyze the situa-
tion by considering the challenger’s possible strategies, and the incumbent’s best
responses to them:
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i. If the challenger never mimics the incumbent when he makes a promise on
a in the first period, the incumbent announces pIa = sa in the first period
for any value of γa. However, it is optimal for the challenger to mimic the
incumbent, given that E(γa) > δ.
ii. If the challenger always mimics the incumbent when he makes a promise on
a in the first period, the incumbent announces pIa = sa in the first period
for any γa < Ξ. However, the challenger has no incentive to mimic the
incumbent, given that the expected precision of the incumbent signal is
(1−z)F (Ξ)2k
z(2k−1)+(1−z)F (Ξ)2kE(γa|γa ≤ Ξ) + z(2k−1)z(2k−1)+(1−z)F (Ξ)2kE(γa) < δ.
iii. If the challenger mimics the incumbent with probability 0 < β < 1, the
incumbent has an incentive to promise pIa = sa in the first period as long as
the incumbent’s probability of winning by announcing pIa = sa in the first
period is greater than his probability of winning by being silent in the first
period. Let G = [0.5,Ξ(β)] be the set of types who speak in the first period.
The probability of winning by announcing pIa = sa in the first period is, for
an incumbent with type γa,
k[2F (G)− (2F (G)− 1)z]− (1− z)F (G)
k[2F (G)− (2F (G)− 1)z]
(
β
1
2
+ (1− β)
(
1
2
+ γaδ −
γa
2
+
δ
2
− δ2
))
+
(1− z)F (G)
k[2F (G)− (2F (G)− 1)z]
(
1
4
+ δ − δ2
)
, (9)
while his probability of winning by being silent in the first period is
2k − 1
2k
(
1
2
+ γaδ −
γa
2
+
δ
2
− δ2
)
+
1
2k
(
1
4
+ δ − δ2
)
. (10)
We first notice that, if γa ≤ δ, it is always optimal for the incumbent to
speak in the first period. If γa > δ, instead, it is optimal for the incumbent
to announce sa in the first period only for low values of β, in particular for
β <
z
(
γa − 12
)
(2k[2F (G)− (2F (G)− 1)z]− 2(1− z)F (G)) (γa − δ)
. (11)
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Now we consider the effect of γa on the difference between equations (9)
and (10). Such effect is(
(1− β)k[2F (G)− (2F (G)− 1)z]− (1− z)F (G)
k[2F (G)− (2F (G)− 1)z] −
2k − 1
2k
)(
δ − 1
2
)
.
(12)
The effect is negative for
β >
z
2k[2F (G)− (2F (G)− 1)z]− 2(1− z)F (G) . (13)
Given that z
2k[2F (G)−(2F (G)−1)z]−2(1−z)F (G) <
z(γa− 12)
(2k[2F (G)−(2F (G)−1)z]−2(1−z)F (G))(γa−δ)
the incumbent’s behavior can be summarized as follows:
• if β ≤ z(γa−
1
2)
(2k[2F (G)−(2F (G)−1)z]−2(1−z)F (G))(γa−δ) the incumbent always choose
to make an early announcement on a;
• if β > z(γa−
1
2)
(2k[2F (G)−(2F (G)−1)z]−2(1−z)F (G))(γa−δ) the incumbent has a thresh-
old strategy such that he releases early announcements for low values
of γa and waits for high values.
We have shown above that no equilibrium can exist in which all types of
the incumbent speak in the first period. Therefore the equilibrium must
arise with β >
z(γa− 12)
(2k[2F (G)−(2F (G)−1)z]−2(1−z)F (G))(γa−δ) . Keeping in mind that
G = [0.5,Ξ(β)] we can see that the threshold Ξ(β) is the minimum between
1 and the solution to the following implicit equation and the maximum
of 0.5 and the solution to the implicit equation, which results from the
indifference of the incumbent between speaking and not-speaking in the
first period.
Ξ(β) =
δ (2k[2F (Ξ(β))− (2F (Ξ(β))− 1)z]− 2(1− z)F (Ξ(β)))− z
2
β (2k[2F (Ξ(β))− (2F (Ξ(β))− 1)z]− 2(1− z)F (Ξ(β)))− z . (14)
Notice that Ξ(1) = Ξ, therefore
(1− z)F (Ξ(1))2k
z(2k − 1) + (1− z)F (Ξ(1))2kE(γa|γa ≤ Ξ(1))+
z(2k − 1)
z(2k − 1) + (1− z)F (Ξ(1))2kE(γa) < δ.
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Moreover Ξ
(
z(γa− 12)
(2k[2F (G)−(2F (G)−1)z]−2(1−z)F (G))(γa−δ)
)
= 1, therefore the con-
ditional expected value is just E(γa) > δ. Given these two relations, and
given the continuity of Ξ(β) (implied by the continuity of the density func-
tion) there exists at least one β∗ ∈
(
z(γa− 12)
(2k[2F (G)−(2F (G)−1)z]−2(1−z)F (G))(γa−δ) , 1
)
such that
(1− z)F (Ξ(β∗))2k
z(2k − 1) + (1− z)F (Ξ(1))2kE(γa|γa ≤ Ξ(β
∗))+
z(2k − 1)
z(2k − 1) + (1− z)F (Ξ(β∗))2kE(γa) = δ.
Therefore there is at least one equilibrium in which the incumbent promises
pIa = sa in the first period for any γa < Ξ(β
∗), such that (1−z)F (Ξ(β
∗))2k
z(2k−1)+(1−z)F (Ξ(β∗))2kE(γa|γa ≤
Ξ(β∗))+ z(2k−1)
z(2k−1)+(1−z)F (Ξ(β∗))2kE(γa) = δ, and the challenger mimics him with prob-
ability β∗. Moreover all the equilibria in this region have this same structure.
B. Distortions and inefficiencies
B.1. Benchmark
The probability of voting such that the correct policy on the relevant issue is
implemented in our benchmark case is:
Pr(ωrel = p
∗
rel) = z {E (r) (1− (1− γa)(1− δa)) + E (1− r) (1− (1− γb)(1− δb))}
+(1− z)
{
Pr
(
r >
1
2
)[
E
(
r|r > 1
2
)
(1− (1− γa)(1− δa))
+ E
(
1− r|r > 1
2
)(
1 + γa − δa
2
γb +
1− γa + δa
2
δb
)]
+ Pr
(
r <
1
2
)[
E
(
(1− r)|r < 1
2
)
(1− (1− γb)(1− δb))
+ E
(
r|r < 1
2
)(
1 + γb − δb
2
γa +
1− γb + δb
2
δa
)]}
. (15)
In fact, with probability z there is on emergency on the relevant issue and
the incumbent is forced to act in the first period. The voters recognize that the
issue must be relevant and vote accordingly. With probability 1 − z the issue
is not relevant. In this case the voters’ behavior depends on the realization of
the public signal r. If r > 1
2
, the voters’ choice is based on issue a; they will
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be able to choose a candidate with the correct proposed policy with probability
1 − (1 − γa)(1 − δa). Therefore, this candidate will be elected that offers the
best policy on a. With probability 1− r, however, the relevant issue is b. If the
incumbent is elected (which happens with probability 1+γa−δa
2
) the probability of
having the correct policy on b is γb; if the challenger is elected (with probability
1−γa+δa
2
) the probability of having a correct policy on b is δb. If r <
1
2
, the voters
base their choice on issue b and the probability of voting for the correct policy is
symmetric.
B.2. Analysis of the distortions
We separately consider the three parametric regions that are relevant for the
equilibrium analysis.
E(γa) < δ. In this case the incumbent always speaks early on issue a and the
challenger never mimicks him; the expected welfare given γa becomes:
Pr(ωrel = p
∗
rel) = z {E (1− r) (1− (1− γb)(1− δb))}
+(1− z + z · E(r))
{
Pr
(
r >
1
2
)[
E
(
r|r > 1
2
)
[1− (1− γa)(1− δa)]
+ E
(
1− r|r > 1
2
)(
1 + γa − δa
2
γb +
1− γa + δa
2
δb
)]
+ Pr
(
1− z
2− z < r ≤
1
2
)[
E
(
r|1− z
2− z < r ≤
1
2
)
[1− (1− γa)(1− δa)]
+ E
(
1− r|1− z
2− z < r ≤
1
2
)(
1 + γa − δa
2
γb +
1− γa + δa
2
δb
)]
+ Pr
(
r ≤ 1− z
2− z
)[
E
(
1− r|r ≤ 1− z
2− z
)
[1− (1− γb)(1− δb)]
+ E
(
r|r ≤ 1− z
2− z
)(
1 + γb − δb
2
γa +
1− γb + δb
2
δa
)]}
. (16)
The incumbent makes an early statement on issue a. This results in two
distortions due to the voters inference regarding the relevance of the issue
and the presence of an emergency. Since the incumbent only speaks on
a, emergency is recognized on issue b. An emergency on issue a, however,
cannot be identified. In this case, the voter is harmed since they do not
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gain certainty about the relevant issue, as they do in the benchmark case.
Furthermore, the probability that issue a is the relevant one is distorted.
For values of r between 1−z
2−z and
1
2
the voters vote on issue a, although b is
more likely to be the relevant issue.
(1−z)F(Ξ)2k
z(2k−1)+(1−z)F(Ξ)2kE(γa|γa ≤ Ξ) + z(2k−1)z(2k−1)+(1−z)F(Ξ)2kE(γa) < δ and E(γa) > δ.
Whenever E(γa) > δ the equilibria display the following behavior: the in-
cumbent makes an early annoucement for low types, and speaks in the
second period for high types; the challenger mimicks him with positive
probability whenever he speaks. The differences are the threshold type that
induces the incumbent to change behavior and the probability of mimicking.
In this first region the threshold type is Ξ(β∗), and the probability of mim-
icking is β ∈ [0, 1]. The expected welfare depends on whether γa > Ξ(β∗)
or not.
• γa > Ξ(β∗). If the incumbent’s competence is such that he only speaks
when there is an emergency and then gets mimicked by the challenger
with probability β, the probability of electing a candidate who pro-
poses the correct policy on the relevant issue is,
Pr(ωrel = p
∗
rel) = z {E (r) [βγa + (1− β) (1− (1− γa)(1− δa))] + E (1− r) (1− (1− γb)(1− δb))}
+(1− z)
{
Pr
(
r >
1
2
)[
E
(
r|r > 1
2
)
(1− (1− γa)(1− δa))
+ E
(
1− r|r > 1
2
)(
1 + γa − δa
2
γb +
1− γa + δa
2
δb
)]
+ Pr
(
r <
1
2
)[
E
(
(1− r)|r < 1
2
)
(1− (1− γb)(1− δb))
+ E
(
r|r < 1
2
)(
1 + γb − δb
2
γa +
1− γb + δb
2
δa
)]}
. (17)
where β = β∗.
The incumbent only speaks when there is an emergency, similar to
the benchmark. If the emergency is on issue is a, the high expected
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competence E(γa) makes the challenger mimic the incumbent with
probability β, thus reducing the probability that a candidate with the
right policy is up for election from 1− (1− γa)(1− δa) to βγa + (1−
β) (1− (1− γa)(1− δa)).
• γa < Ξ(β∗). If the challenger speaks early and is mimicked by the
challenger with probability β, the expected welfare becomes
Pr(ωrel = p
∗
rel) = z {E (1− r) (1− (1− γb)(1− δb))} (18)
+(1− z + z · E(r))
{
Pr(r >
1
2
)β
[
E(r|r > 1
2
)[γa] + E(1− r|r >
1
2
)
γb + δb
2
]
+ Pr
(
r >
1
2
)
(1− β)
[
E
(
r|r > 1
2
)
[1− (1− γa)(1− δa)]
+ E
(
1− r|r > 1
2
)(
1 + γa − δa
2
γb +
1− γa + δa
2
δb
)]
+ Pr(
1− z
2− z < r ≤
1
2
)β
[
E(r|1− z
2− z < r ≤
1
2
)[γa] + E(1− r|
1− z
2− z < r ≤
1
2
)
γb + δb
2
]
+ Pr
(
1− z
2− z < r ≤
1
2
)
(1− β)
[
E
(
r|1− z
2− z < r ≤
1
2
)
[1− (1− γa)(1− δa)]
+ E
(
1− r|1− z
2− z < r ≤
1
2
)(
1 + γa − δa
2
γb +
1− γa + δa
2
δb
)]
+ Pr(r ≤ 1− z
2− z )β
[
E(1− r|r ≤ 1− z
2− z )[1− (1− γb)(1− δb)] + E(r|r ≤
1− z
2− z )
γa + δa
2
]
+ Pr
(
r ≤ 1− z
2− z
)
(1− β)
[
E
(
1− r|r ≤ 1− z
2− z
)
[1− (1− γb)(1− δb)]
+ E
(
r|r ≤ 1− z
2− z
)(
1 + γb − δb
2
γa +
1− γb + δb
2
δa
)]}
.
(1−z)F(Ξ)2k
z(2k−1)+(1−z)F(Ξ)2kE(γa|γa ≤ Ξ) + z(2k−1)z(2k−1)+(1−z)F(Ξ)2kE(γa) < δ In this case the
incumbent makes an early annoucement forγa < Ξ, and speaks in the second
period for higher types; the challenger mimicks him whenever he speaks
early. The expected welfare depends on γa.
• γa > Ξ. If the incumbent’s competence is such that he only speaks
when there is an emergency and then gets mimicked by the challenger,
the probability of electing a candidate who proposes the correct policy
on the relevant issue is,
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Pr(ωrel = p
∗
rel) = z {E (r) γa + E (1− r) (1− (1− γb)(1− δb))}
+(1− z)
{
Pr
(
r >
1
2
)[
E
(
r|r > 1
2
)
(1− (1− γa)(1− δa))
+ E
(
1− r|r > 1
2
)(
1 + γa − δa
2
γb +
1− γa + δa
2
δb
)]
+ Pr
(
r <
1
2
)[
E
(
(1− r)|r < 1
2
)
(1− (1− γb)(1− δb))
+ E
(
r|r < 1
2
)(
1 + γb − δb
2
γa +
1− γb + δb
2
δa
)]}
. (19)
The incumbent only speaks when there is an emergency, similar to
the benchmark. If the emergency is on issue a, the high expected
competence E(γa) makes the challenger mimic the incumbent, thus
reducing the probability that a candidate with the right policy is up
for election from 1− (1− γa)(1− δa) to γa.
• γa < Ξ.
If the challenger speaks early and is mimicked by the challenger, the
expected welfare becomes
Pr(ωrel = p
∗
rel) = z {E (1− r) (1− (1− γb)(1− δb))} (20)
+(1− z + z · E(r))
{
Pr(r >
1
2
)
[
E(r|r > 1
2
)[γa] + E(1− r|r >
1
2
)
γb + δb
2
]
+ Pr(
1− z
2− z < r ≤
1
2
)
[
E(r|1− z
2− z < r ≤
1
2
)[γa] + E(1− r|
1− z
2− z < r ≤
1
2
)
γb + δb
2
]
+ Pr(r ≤ 1− z
2− z )
[
E(1− r|r ≤ 1− z
2− z )[1− (1− γb)(1− δb)] + E(r|r ≤
1− z
2− z )
γa + δa
2
]}
.
In this case the incumbent makes an early statement and gets mim-
icked by the challenger. On top of the distortions present in the pre-
vious case, the imitation reduces the probability that a candidate who
proposes the right policy is available, as in the first range considered.
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